Johnson: Ricks v. Idaho Contractors Board and Religious Freedom (Case Summ

Ricks v. Idaho Contractors Board and Religious Freedom
Case Summary
by Sam W. Johnson
Idaho Law Review
The Supreme Court of the United States could decide an Idaho case concerning the free
exercise of religion. George Ricks holds a religious belief that social security numbers are the
“mark of the beast.”1 Due to this belief, he refused to provide his social security number on an
application for a state work license.2 The Idaho Bureau of Occupational Licensing denied the
application, refusing to grant a religious exemption.3 Ricks brought suit, claiming the state must
provide an exemption because of his sincere religious belief. 4 After failing in the Idaho courts,
Ricks filed his petition for writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court in July 2019; the Court
relisted the case several times, and has kept the case on hold since February 2020.5
Employment Division v. Smith is the leading case in the law of religious free exercise.6 In
Smith, the Court held that the First Amendment right of free exercise “does not relieve an
individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability.”7
Critics immediately assailed the holding. They argued that under the Sherbert/Yoder “compelling
interest” standard, 8 the free exercise clause did indeed require individual religious exemptions be
made even to neutral laws. 9
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https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/ricks-v-idaho-contractors-board/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2021). A case is
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Orders, SCOTUSBLOG (June 24, 2013, 8:48 AM),
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6
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motivation, the law is not neutral . . . and it is invalid unless it is justified by a compelling interest and is narrowly
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Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (“We must . . . consider whether some compelling state interest . . .
justifies the substantial infringement of appellant’s First Amendment right.”); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215
(1972) (“[O]nly those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims
to the free exercise of religion.”).
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(1990). But see James E. Ryan, Note, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic
Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1412–13 (1992) (“Despite the obvious change Smith brought to the language of
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that courts were the leading institutional protectors of religious liberty.”).
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Congress agreed with Smith’s critics and passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA).10 The explicit purpose of RFRA was “to restore the compelling interest test . . . in all
cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened.”11 RFRA’s “compelling interest”
test requires the government to demonstrate that any burden to a person’s exercise of religion is
in furtherance of a substantial government interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering
that interest.12
The Roberts Court has applied and strengthened RFRA in several holdings.13 Most
notably, in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, the Court held that an employer could claim RFRA
exemption from a requirement to provide contraception coverage in employee health insurance
plans.14 Writing for the majority, Justice Alito noted that in RFRA, “Congress went far beyond
what this Court has held is constitutionally required.”15 More recently, in Tanzin v. Tanvir, the
Court unanimously held that RFRA provides for a right to seek damages against individual
government officials in their personal capacities.16
Dicta from two opinions last term also demonstrate the conservative Justices’ support of
powerful RFRA protections for religious exercise. In Bostock v. Clayton County, the Court held
that Title VII’s ban on sex discrimination extended to protections for homosexual and
transgender employees. 17 But in his majority opinion, Justice Gorsuch noted that RFRA,
operating “as a kind of super statute,” might “supersede Title VII’s commands in appropriate
cases.”18 In Little Sisters of the Poor v. Pennsylvania, the Court again examined the issue of
employer religious exemption from participation in employee contraception coverage.19
Although that case was disposed of under the Administrative Procedures Act, Justice Thomas
emphasized that federal agencies should consider RFRA when promulgating rules and
regulations.20
The addition of Justice Amy Coney Barrett to the Court further implicates the future of
RFRA and the First Amendment’s religion clauses. Joined by Justices Alito, Gorsuch,
Kavanaugh, and Thomas, she voted to strike down New York state limitations imposed on
religious gatherings during the COVID-19 pandemic.21 The holding departed from prior
decisions on substantially similar fact patterns, where Chief Justice Roberts joined the liberal
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situations that fall squarely within the holdings of pre-Smith cases.”).
16
Tanzin v. Tanvir, 141 S. Ct. 486 (2020). Justice Barrett did not take part in the decision.
17
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justices, including the late Justice Ginsburg, to uphold such limitations.22 Justice Barrett’s
influence will also be felt in a forthcoming decision on Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, where the
Court will analyze RFRA’s application to a religious foster agency that refuses to grant adoption
certificates to unmarried or same-sex partners.23
How do these broader developments affect George Ricks’ chances at the nation’s highest
court? Ricks argues that the Supreme Court should overturn Smith,24 and the current Court may
be amenable to doing so.25 Overturning Smith would give constitutional status to the “compelling
interest” standard. This would be a victory for religious liberty proponents because RFRA, a law
enacted by federal statute, cannot be applied against the states.26
But the Court could also resolve Ricks’ case short of overturning Smith. The Idaho
Bureau of Occupational Licensing denied Ricks’ application because a federal law (Section 666,
appropriately enough) required the agency to collect social security numbers.27 The Idaho Court
of Appeals refused to apply RFRA’s “compelling interest” standard to the federal law in
question, reasoning that RFRA was inapplicable because “a RFRA claim . . . must include
federal government defendants.”28 The Court could reverse on this narrow basis, concluding that
Idaho was in fact required to review the federal law under RFRA.
Other actions remain available to the Court on Ricks’ case. The Court could deny
certiorari, leaving the Idaho decision standing. The Court might also choose to dispose of the
case without a hearing, perhaps in tandem with a forthcoming decision in Fulton. Because the
case has been pending before the Court for some time, it is likely that at least some of the
Justices are interested in taking up the case. Overall, given the broader developments that have
taken place with the Court’s makeup and the development of RFRA doctrine, Ricks’ case is
certainly one to watch.
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urt? (“[T]he decision is the first clear indication of the importance of the late Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg having
been replaced by Barrett.”).
23
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https://www.washingtonpost.com/religion/2020/11/03/
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